![]() ![]() It documents not only how much power elites have, but also the obstacles they would need to resolve to work together. I develop a measure of elite collective action based on this framework. Conflicting interests can leave seemingly powerful elites unable to agree on when or how to challenge the dictator. I argue that, even when power-sharing is pervasive, a lack of cohesiveness can rob regime members of their influence over dictators. ![]() ![]() What allows autocratic political elites to coordinate with each other and check dictators? Earlier work assumes that elite coordination becomes easier as dictators share more power. Incorporating these findings in future work will strengthen the theory, methods, and concepts used to understand the legal approaches that regulate civil society. Competing risk models suggest different laws have different risk factors, which implies these laws are more conceptually distinct than equivalent. The study finds that given ICCPR ratification, constitutions that privilege treaties above ordinary legislation create an institutional context that makes adoption less likely. The study then uses competing risk models to assess whether the factors that predict adoption vary across law types. The first analysis studies the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and constitution-level differences regarding international treaties’ status. First, do institutional differences affect the adoption of these laws? Second, do laws that appear different in content also have different causes? A two-stage analysis addresses these questions using data from 138 countries from 1993 to 2012. This article asks two questions of a thoroughly researched form of legal repression: restrictions on foreign aid to CSOs. In short, leaders keep power by spreading it around, but limiting the chances of others to capture it.Ī growing number of researchers study the laws that regulate the third sector and caution the legal expansion is a global crackdown on civil society. All ministers and ministries experience significant volatility, in line with how regimes manage, maintain and limit the influence of inclusive coalitions. In modern autocracies and transitioning democracies, leaders select cabinet coalitions of elites that broadly inclusive, but distort the levels of power groups and elites enjoy within senior ranks. This paper measures the heterogenous political environments developing across African states, and presents evidence that African states are largely ethnically and regionally inclusive in formal political positions, with relatively low levels of co-ethnic favoritism and large group dominance. An associated perception is that regimes are ethnically exclusive as leaders over-represent co-ethnics, close allies and some strong challengers as a coup-proofing exercise. Political representation of groups across Africa is often portrayed as a result of static, predictable ethno-demographic arithmetic. This project is a disaggregated set of cabinet ministers and positions by country month from 1997 into real time. This article presents ACPED- the African Cabinet and Political Elite Data project. Implications for interorganizational networks are discussed. For instance, our results offer important insights into the consequences of closure mechanisms, the applicability of preferential attachment to real-world networks, and the nuances of homophily in network formation on multidimensional relationships in a communication network. Our results challenge some long held assumptions about the mechanisms that influence network formation. This study considers how the strength of ties and multiplex relationships among organizations may reveal a more complex explanation for why networks take on certain structures. Yet, those studies assume relationships among organizations are either present or absent. Recent interorganizational communication research has taken up the question: why are networks structured the way they are? This line of inquiry has advanced communication network research by helping explain how and why networks take on certain structures or why certain organizations become positioned advantageously (or not). ![]()
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